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No! The economist is not King; quite true. But he ought to be! He is a
better and wiser governor than the general or diplomatist or the oratorical
lawyer .... But where the rulers of the State dethrone the ecoenomic

power in favor of the false idols of diplomacy or any other of Monsieur
Hanotaux's mystic and incalculable forces, squalor follows, and the Mayor
of Pargnan lives and dies in a cellar.
John Maynard Keynes, The Reconstruction of Europe (1922)'

In Western Europe they had... mistaken ideas about the reconstruction
of Europe .... [W]e meet frequently with the view that the destruction

* © Nathaniel Berman, Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of
Law. I would like to thank Marie-Claire Belleau, Jerry Frog, James Hackney, David
Kennedy, Duncan Kennedy, and Daniel Schaffer.
1. John Maynard Keynes, The Reconstruction of Europe: An Introduction, THE
MANCHEsTER GuARAN COMoMuRcI, SUPPLEMEr, May 18, 1922, at 66, 67.
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of Austria was a mistake, because a great economic block in Central
Europe was a necessity, and that it must, therefore, be established
again . . . . The war caused the nationalism of all the different peoples
there to expand to such a degree that any attempt to suppress it would
lead to another terrible war . . . . [S]uch plans are nothing but illusions,
chimeras, and phantasies for a long, long time to come.
Dr. Edward Beneg, The Problem of the Reconstruction of Central Europe (1923)2
I.

DISCIPLINES OF RECONSTRUCTION: PERENNIAL
PROBLEMS, RECURRENT RIVALRIES

"At the expense of the nation," the Diet of Poland published in 1921
a speech by a scholarly parliamentary deputy on an issue central to national pride and economic prosperity. Deputy Andrzej Wierzbicki's
speech,3 entitled, The Truth About Upper Silesia,4 concerned a region
Germany and Poland had been disputing since the end of World War
. 5 Deputy Wierzbicki began his speech with a description of the twofold structure of the debate:
The Upper Silesian question arose from two, equally important factors.
One factor was the living Silesian people, the realization of President
Wilson's principles which . . . would have certainty as to the will of the
people, of that living feeling of a people which had been in the possession of another state, and which is to be united into one national entity
with its mother nation.
But the one principle of nationality is not enough to defend Upper
Silesia. Above it there rises more and more obstinately the economic factor . . . A book appeared by Keynes, an eminent English economist,
Secretary to the Royal Economic Institute in London, the author of a
well-known work on India, that pearl of the English crown, that land
which is a beloved subject of study to the English. Through such studies
a man may win himself name and fame ....
Keynes' thesis is that a
new political world cannot be built up without the economic rebuilding of
the whole of Europe, including Germany ....
And behold the whole

2.

Edward Beneg, The Problem of the Reconstruction of Central Europe, THE
Jan. 4, 1923, at 721, 722.
Wierzbicki authored a series of works on Polish political and constitutional

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN COMMERCIAL, SUPPLEMENT,

3.
history.
4.

ANDRZEJ WIERZBICKI, THE TRUTH ABOUT UPPER SILESIA (1921).

5.

Id.
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world began to repeat after Keynes that the Germans could not stand
without Upper Silesia. 6
This passage establishes a dichotomy between two sets of issues, two
projects, situating itself in an already ongoing contest between what I
shall call two "disciplines of reconstruction." Wierzbicki first describes
the "will" and "living feeling" of a "people" and a nation's desire to
unite into one "national entity with its mother nation," in conformity
with noble Wilsonian ideals. To this harmony of organic nationalism
and principled internationalism, he caustically juxtaposes the "economic
factor," the "economic rebuilding of the whole of Europe," and the
congruence between British imperialism and one English economist's
ambitions
Keynes had set up a similar dichotomy in the book that was the
subject of Wierzbicki's polemic, the attack on the Versailles Treaty
published in 1919 as the Economic Consequences of the -Peace?
Keynes, however, had reversed the relative importance to be accorded
each of "the two factors."
To what a different future Europe might have looked forward if either
Mr. Lloyd George or Mr. Wilson had apprehended that the most serious
of the problems which claimed their attention were not political or territorial but financial and economic, and that the perils of the future lay not
in frontiers or sovereignties, but in food, coal, and transport.t'

For Keynes, the key problems facing Europe were thus those of
economics, not nationalism. Keynes, moreover, rejected the configuration
of nationalism and internationalism he discerned in the Treaty.
The Wilsonian dogma, which exalts and dignifies the divisions of race
and nationality above the bonds of trade and culture, and guarantees frontiers but not happiness, is deeply embedded in the conception of the
League of Nations as at present constituted. It yields us the paradox that
the first experiment in internationalgovernment should exert its influence
in the direction of intensifying nationalism."

6.
7.

Id. at 8-10.
Id.

8. Id.
9. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE
(1919) [hereinafter ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES].

10. See id. at 146.
11. John Maynard Keynes, A Revision of the Treaty, reprinted in 111 TIE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 1, 8 (Moggridge ed., 1972).
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Rather than Wierzbicki's nationalist/internationalist harmony, Keynes
thus saw the Treaty as embodying the cruel "paradox" that the new
international "experiment" would bring into being an intense version of
the very nationalism to which it was purportedly only responding. Indeed, for Keynes, even the paradigmatic implementation of the principle
of nationalities by the Versailles settlement, the creation of Poland,
should be subordinated to general economic reconstruction. With a mixture of prejudice and prophecy, Keynes quipped: "unless her great
neighbors are prosperous and orderly, Poland is an economic impossibility with no industry but Jew-baiting."' 2
The Keynes/Wierzbicki polemic is not an historical curiosity; it is a
particularly striking instance of disciplinary rivalries that have regularly
resurfaced during periods of international instability in this century, most
recently in the post-1989 period. Such periods see the emergence of distinctive, often competing, academic and policymaking disciplines. Each
of these disciplines seeks to identify the key sources of social, cultural,
and political instability and to propose its own innovative ideas and
institutions in response. The period following World War I, like our
own time, was particularly rich in such endeavors. An anxiety to repair
the cultural chaos wrought by the war heavily marked European discussions of social conflict, 3 gender roles, 4 and art, 5 as well as nationalism and economics. On the occasion of this conference, 6 I examine
the relationship between two such disciplines-those concerned with
economics and nationalism-through an interpretation of some of John

12. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES, supra note 9 at 291.
13.
See generally CHARLES S. MAIER, RECASTING BOURGEOIS EUROPE: STABILIZATION IN FRANCE, GERMANY, AND ITALY IN THE DECADE AFTER WORLD WAR I 1986 (1975) (discussing class conflicts in post-World War I Europe).
14. See, e.g., SUSAN K. KENT, MAKING PEACE: THE RECONSTRUCTION OF GENDER IN INTERWAR BRITAIN (1993) (exploring World War I's effects on feminism and
the feminist movement); MARY LOUISE ROBERTS, CIVILIZATION WITHOUT SExEs: RE-

CONSTRUCTING GENDER IN POSTWAR FRANCE, 1917-1927 183-211 (1994) (examining
images of the changes in gender roles in France following World War I).
15.
See, e.g., AMEDtE OZENFANT & CHARLES-EDOUARD JEANNERET GRIS [LE
CORBUSIER], APRtS LE CUBISME (1918). See generally CHRISTOPHER GREEN, CUBISM
AND ITS ENEMIES (1987) (discussing Cubism in France between 1916 and 1928);
KENNETH SILVER, ESPRIT DE CORPS: THE ART OF THE PARISIAN AVANT-GARDE AND

THE FIRST WORLD WAR, 1914-1925 (1989)

(examining Parisian art and architecture

during and after World War I).
This article originated in a paper delivered at the International Economic Law
16.
Section of the American Society of International Law. in February, 1994.
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Maynard Keynes' writings. For Want of better terms, we can provisionally designate the two disciplines that I will discuss as "economic" and
"political" reconstruction, although I will only address specific versions
of each.
Focusing on three different stages of Keynes' development, I will
show that he accompanied each of his changing conceptions of economic reconstruction with a different interpretation of nationalism.' Given
the simultaneous surfacing of the problems of economics and nationalism in post-World War I public debate, and the structuring of that
debate by a choice between them, Keynes apparently felt that the only
way to argue for the priority of his own discipline was through somehow confronting the claims of the other. Thus, as Keynes formulated
different versions of economic reconstruction, he first sought to exclude
nationalism as incompatible with economic reconstruction, then to enlist
it as an ally, or even an agent, of economic planning, and finally, to
subject it,' as a "cultural" force, to international discipline, along with
"economic" forces.
Yet, I will also suggest that Keynes shared many central cultural assumptions with those who saw nationalism as the key interwar problem,
particularly some international legal writers. 8 The similarities between
the disciplines' fears and fantasies about economic and nationalist forces,
respectively, suggest that we need to educe the elements of a shared
cultural matrix at work, rather than view the similarities as simply a
coincidence of the results of separate inquiries into specific problems.
My interpretation thus seeks to go beyond the notion of Keynes as a
mere technocrat-or, rather, to recover some of the political and cultural
assumptions on the basis of which modem technocracy emerged. This
approach rejects the view, shared by some of his contemporaries, 9 that
Keynes did not consider the political and cultural desires, especially
those of nationalism, that provided the context for more strictly "economic" impulses. I have incorporated Keynes' views of such questions
partly by aggressively interpreting his well-known "technical" works in
light of lesser-known writings that others might consider as inessential.

17.

See infra parts II, III, and IV and accompanying notes (discussing the evolu-

tion of Keynes' interpretations of nationalism and economic reconstruction).
18.

See infra part V and accompanying notes (examining the underlying cultural

assumptions of Keynes and some of his contemporaries).
19.

See WLHBELM R6PKE, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DiSINTEGRATION 4 (1942)

(arguing that commentators must not overlook the effect of nationalism on the international economy).
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The structuring of much of the public debate in the interwar period
by a choice between economic and political approaches began no later
than the very first session of the Assembly of the League of Nations in
1920.0 The Italian delegate, Tittoni, declared that the League's economic role was "an indispensable supplement" to its political and legal
functions." When the Canadian delegate responded that the League
should not sacrifice its "main function of defending the peace,"2'
Tittoni upped the ante, moving the economic question from a position of
"supplementarity" to that of primacy: the international economic question
was "the most important, the question of the future, upon which will de'
pend peace or war between nations."23
The debate between the disciplines may similarly be described as the
effort of each to show that its concerns were primary, while still finding
it necessary to deal with the "indispensable supplement" of the concerns
of the other. Closing out the era's debates with his famous 1944 attack
on Keynes' 1919 book, Etienne Mantoux argued that commentators
should accord nationalism both practical and moral priority over economics and that failure to do so would lead to a misinterpretation of
both.24 Thus, in "view of the national passions with which Europe was
ablaze," the Paris peacemakers "did not think it possible to set even
economic recovery in train before Europe had been made again peaceful
and orderly." Moreover, the "choice between economic and political
advantage ... rest[s] in the last resort, upon a choice of values." 6 The
"Belgians had preferred the honor of the nation to the blessings of German state insurance;"2' 7 similarly, "the statesmen of 1919 must have
believed that economic reconstruction could not be obtained at the price
Finally, much of his book (like
of spiritual destruction."2
Wierzbicki's), was devoted to refuting Keynes on economic terms and to
showing that Keynes' belief in the primacy of economics had led him to

20. William Rappard, Le Nationalisme iconomique et la Sociiti des Nations, in
61 RECUEIL DES COURS 103, 160 (111-1937).
21.
Id.
22. Id. at 162-63.
23. Id. at 165.
24. ETIENNE MANTOUX, THE CARTHIGINIAN PEACE (1946). Mantoux, son of an
adviser to Clemenceau at the Paris Peace Conference, died in battle in Bavaria shortly
before the Allied victory in World War II.
25.
Id. at 41.
26. Id. at 42.
27. Id. at 44.
28.
Id.
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misdescribe the potential political resistance to the Treaty as its economic impossibility.29
Disciplinary rivalry between "economic" and "political" reconstruction
has resurfaced in the post-Cold War period, expressing itself both in the
establishment of distinct groups of experts interested in each set of
problems and in the sense that one has to choose which set to treat as
central. The rivalry appears in the establishment of an academic and
policymaking division of labor between those concerned with, for example, problems of separatist nationalism, minority rights, and international
competence over civil conflicts, on the one hand, and those concerned
with free trade, economic integration, and transnational regulation, on
the other. To be sure, few sophisticated observers would today declare
that problems of nationalist conflict are "really" problems of economic
stability, or vice versa; nonetheless, the notion lingers, in scholarly
writing as well as in public debate, that problems grouped under the
economics rubric might explain the emergence of those under the nationalist rubric, or vice versa. We are beset by fears and fantasies about
such seemingly overwhelming new forces as "economic globalization"
and the "new nationalism;" we anxiously witness the loss of familiar
structures and seek to create ways of benefitting from the new social
forces while restraining them within new manageable frameworks. The
relationship between these two sets of concerns remains unclear, despite
the growing acceptance that they often are intertwined in practice, if not
in theory.
Studying the interwar period shows the historical depth of this recurrent rivalry, as well as the complexity of the relationship between the
two approaches-a complexity which goes beyond the commonsensical
notion that what is at issue is a false choice. When one examines the
disciplines of reconstruction as they emerged during the interwar period,
one sees that the difference between them is not an opposition between
what one could call "vulgar" nationalism and economism-i.e., theories
that identify one specific social domain as that which alone is eminently
real, as an unambiguously self-interpreting and self-regulating unit that
29. Id. at 156-58.
30. Many observers attempt, however obscurely, to link the various reconstructive
projects. For example, Frans Andriessen, then vice-president of the European Commission, declared in 1992 that the integration of Eastern European countries into the
European Community would "give new impetus to economic reconstruction, encourage
investment, and dampen excessive nationalism." Frans Andriessen, Europe and the
World After 1992, Address Before the U.K. Presidency Conference, Sept. 7, 1992,

available in LEXIS, News Library, RAPID File.
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determines overall social development. Certainly, both Keynes and those
interwar lawyers who took nationalism as their main focus manifested
strains of such simplistic approaches. Nonetheless, limiting a description
of their ideas to these strains would overlook the innovativeness of their
work as a whole, which consisted in radical departures from such simplistic understandings of their respective domains.
Rather, both Keynes and these interwar legal writers reconceptualized
their respective fields of inquiry, "the economy" and "the nation," as
turbulent domains of multiple and conflicting forces. They viewed such
forces with deep ambivalence, at once welcoming their capacity to dissolve outmoded, rigid, pre-war social forms, while fearing their
unboundedness and their potential for perverse excess. They sought the
energy of business forces for the revitalization of the economy and the
energy of nationalism for that of the state and the international political
order, yet, they feared the destabilization of the economic and political
orders by the unrestrained, transnational quality of both capital movements and nationalist appetites. Such writers believed that the loyalty of
the forces unleashed by the collapse of pre-war society to the new political or economic order could be secured through an "alliance" with
newly sophisticated agencies of high policy.3 As I shall show,
Keynes' aspiration to "harness"32 the "uncontrollable and disobedient
psychology of the business world"33 is structurally similar to the aspiration of some interwar lawyers to "discipline"34 the "elemental forc' Both
es"'35 underlying the "psychological foundations of the nation."36
disciplines sought to create new, autonomous policy institutions, staffed
by those trained in their respective fields and insulated from the pressures of those whose interests or knowledge rendered them incapable of

31.
ROBERT REDSLOB, LE PRINCIPE DES NATIONALrES 35 (1931). A similar idea
was expressed in the artistic innovations of the time: "The alliance of primitivism and
abstraction is one of the most copiously documented facts of the [Modernist] period."
J.C. Middleton, The Rise of Primitivism and its Relevance to the Poetry of Expressionism and Dada, in THE DISCONTINUOUS TRADITION: STUDIES IN GERMAN LITERATURE IN HONOUR OF ERNEST LUDWIG STAHL 182, 194 (P.F. Ganz ed., 1971). See
generally ROBERT GOLDWATER, PRIMITIVISM IN MODERN ART (Ist ed. 1938; 2d ed.
1986).
32. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST
AND MONEY 376-77 (1936) [hereinafter GENERAL THEORY].
33. Id. at 317.
34. REDSLOB, supra note 31, at 35.
35. Id.at 13.
36. Id.at 39.
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establishing the required alliance. Only such institutions could give constructive shape and meaning to the new, unstable social forces. For these
disciplines, the "real" played the role of a normative concept, the productive economy and the stable political order to which policy would
compel psychological forces to commit themselves, rather than a pre-existing characteristic of either economics or politics."
Confidence in the efficacy of a newly sophisticated form of reason to
deal with such frightening and fascinating forces was the product, not of
technocratic reason, but of a historically specific form of faith. Each of
these disciplines embodied a dream that this advanced reason would
construct innovative institutions capable of bringing out the fullest creative possibilities of the energies at large in the postwar world, while restraining their excesses. The structure that Keynes pejoratively identified
as the "paradox" of the Versailles treatment of nationalism--that "experimental" international authority would bring into being an "intense" form
of nationalism-may be applied to his own conception of the relationship between a novel, augmented policy authority and the economy.
This notion, that a high cultural agency would come into "paradoxical"
relationship with vital social forces which would only thereby achieve
their fullest expression, is that which, in a series of studies, I have been
calling a particular variety of "high modernism." The deep cultural dimension of the analysis undertaken by both disciplines of reconstruction
is emphasized by their shared references to images of the psychological
and cultural "primitive" pervasive in cultural modernism," as well as to
images of gender crisis prevalent in the interwar period.' The paradoxical modernist faith was made attractive by a general cultural crisis

37. See, e.g., infra notes 127-36 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Nathaniel Berman, "But the Alternative is Despair": European Nationalism and the Modernist Renewal of InternationalLaw, 106 HARv. L REV. 1792
(1993) [hereinafter European Nationalism]; Nathaniel Berman, Modernism, Nationalism,
and the Rhetoric of Reconstruction, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 351 (1992) [hereinafter
Rhetoric of Reconstruction]; Nathaniel Berman, A Perilous Ambivalence: Nationalist
Desire, Legal Autonomy, and the Limits of the Interwar Framework, 33 HARv. INr'L
L. J. 353 (1992).
39. See Rhetoric of Reconstruction, supra note 38, at 354. Please note that I use
"modernism" in the sense used by cultural historians of the early twentieth century,
not in the sense often used by economists.
40. See generally KENT, supra note 14 (describing the post-World War I feminist
movement in Great Britain); ROBERTS, supra note 14 (discussing images of postWorld War I gender roles in France).
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marked by the terror and desire of such imagined forces, emerging out
of a perceived loss of institutional and ideological moorings.
The "disciplinarity" of these rival approaches to reconstruction should
be understood in two related ways. First, I have in mind academic and
policymaking "disciplines," which take as their explicit theme the need
to reconstruct social, political or cultural life. Secondly, I intend the
term "discipline" in its other sense, as well, that of training unruly forces by channelling restless energy into socially useful forms. In the
Twenties, as in the Nineties, distinctive "disciplines" emerged, sometimes bringing together insights or experts from other, more familiar
disciplinary divisions, seeking to "discipline" through innovative expertise and institutions forces that had shaken formerly taken for granted
social forms.
The historical approach underlying this article requires a revision of
more familiar notions of the relation between these two disciplines. For
example, if we can trace the rivalry between the disciplines to their
common formative period in the early interwar period, we must reject
the notion of an older, traditional public international law eventually
yielding (perhaps after 1945, perhaps after 1989) to an international
economic policy perspective. Rather, at least from the establishment of
the new international institutional world after World War I, each of
these disciplines sought to establish its own innovative authority, and
sought to do so, in part, in competition with the other. In some respects,
we may even need to reverse the familiar account: the post-World War
I discipline of reconstruction in public international law, with its distinctive treatment of its central concerns such as nationalism, sovereignty,
and internationalism, may be understood, in part, as an attempt to respond to a trenchant critique of the Versailles Treaty by one of the
century's leading economists. In any event, we will see that their respective innovative features mean that familiar characterizations of their
relationship-private vs. public, technocratic vs. humanistic, innovative
vs. traditional, even, above all, "economic" vs. "political"-areinadequate.
The remainder of this article is divided into four parts. Parts II, III,
and IV discuss Keynes' views of the relationship between nationalism,
economics, and international authority in the early interwar period, the
mid-Thirties, and the early Forties, respectively. Part V discusses the
modernist faith that Keynes' discipline of reconstruction shared with
what I call the "international legal modernism"' of some interwar writ41.

See articles cited supra note 38.
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ers, a faith necessary for justification of their policy proposals; I ask
whether our awareness of the underlying cultural assumptions of these
writers might enable us to formulate a more critical perspective on our
own situation. Throughout my discussion of Keynes, I use the Economic
Consequences of the Peace as a point of departure for understanding his
work.'2 From this unconventional perspective, I seek to understand his
work as the creation of a discipline of reconstruction, as a response to
the pervasive, although protean, sense of economic, political, and cultural crisis that the interwar years share with our own.
II. NATIONALISM EXCLUDED: THE ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE
Keynes' Economic Consequences may be read as a disciplinary brief
for a focus on economic reconstruction, an argument which depends on
a subordinating interpretation of the central concerns of its "political"
rival, particularly those relating to nationalism. Written after Keynes
resigned from the British delegation to the Peace Conference in protest,
the Economic Consequences attacked the basic conception of the Versailles Treaty, the construction of a new set of international authorities
to oversee the dismantling of the German Empire, and the establishment
of a new central European political order. 3 Keynes criticized aspects of
the territorial settlement, scoffed at the reorganization of Central Europe
along national lines, and excoriated both the magnitude of the reparations imposed on Germany and the mechanisms provided for supervising
payment." Keynes sought to establish his own discipline of reconstruc-

42. I note at the outset that my unusual focus, approaching Keynes' works from
the perspective of the problems set forth in the ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCS. departs
somewhat from the terrain of the fascinating recent debates in Keynes-interpretation.
Those familiar with these debates will, nevertheless, recognize that the nature of my
interest in Keynes fimly situates me in the field of what one writer has tendentiously
called Keynesian "fundamentalism." See ALAN CODDINOrON, KEYNESIAN ECOC,O!,vc,
THE SEARCH FOR FiRST PRINCIPLES 92-111 (1983) (contrasting the "fundamentalists,"
the "hydraulicists," and the "reconstituted reductionists"). I view the "fundamentalist"
school of Keynes scholarship as concerned with the textual interpretation of Keynes'
writings, rather than with any notion of "original intent." Since I do not believe that
textual interpretation in this or any other domain should or could truly capture the
"original intent" of an author, I have no problem in situating my analysis in this
field.
43.

See

ECONOMIC

CONSEQUENCES, supra note 9, at 56-112, 226-51 (criticizing

the Treaty and post-Treaty restructuring of Central Europe).
44. See id. at 113-225.
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tion by providing an alternative view of the key source of instability in
European affairs ("the perils of the future lay not in frontiers or sover' ) and promoting policies and
eignties, but in food, coal, and transport"45
institutions that would be centered around those concerns.46
Keynes prefaced his book with an historical analysis of the European
economic situation, which foreshadowed his distinctive definition of the
"economic" realm, a conception that gives a crucial role to psychological factors. Keynes viewed the half century preceding World War I as
an "extraordinary episode in the economic progress of man."47 Although many accepted the economic prosperity of the period as "natural,
permanent, and to be depended on," it was in fact "peculiar [and] intensely unusual."" This period of unprecedented productivity rested on
several components, including nearly-free trade throughout Europe, stable
currencies, a Central Europe dominated by a "vast and complicated
[German] industrial machine,"49' and an implicit social compact between
classes. This last factor amounted to a "double buff' in which the desires of the various social classes were restrained by "convention."5
On the one hand, the laboring classes accepted . . . or were compelled,
persuaded or cajoled by custom, convention, authority, and the well-established order of Society into accepting, a situation in which they could call
their own very little of the cake that they and Nature and the capitalists
were cooperating to produce. And on the other hand the capitalist classes
were allowed to call the best part of the cake theirs . . ., on the tacit
underlying condition that they consumed very little of it in practice.5
This analysis showed the "unstable psychological conditions" 2 underlying the "delicate organization by which these peoples lived,"53 and
the merely "conventional" quality of arrangements that some had taken
as natural, particularly the fragility of the commitment of economic
actors to the productive economy. While potentially destabilizing psy-

45.

46.
building
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 146.

See, e.g., id. at 252-98 (offering suggestions alternative to the Treaty for reEurope).
Id at I1.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 13.

50.

Id. at 19.

51.
52.

Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 21-22.

53.

Id. at 15.
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chological desires were restrained, "[i]n the unconscious recesses of its
being, Society knew what it was about.""5
For Keynes, as for other disciplinarians of reconstruction, the War
and its aftermath upset this "delicate organization," unleashing two main
sorts of potentially unrestrained desire, those of nationalists and economic actors 5 The Versailles settlement established an array of new political frontiers across a Central Europe principally structured before 1914
by the three borders between Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary.
These new frontiers would be harmless in a regime of free trade. Yet,
under postwar conditions, they would result in economic irrationality
because "nationalism and private interest"56 would insist on the imposition of barriers between factors of production. The German economic
machine, for example, would be disrupted by the loss of the coal fields
of the Saar and Upper Silesia 7 and the iron ore of the Lorraine!' By
thus allowing "economic frontiers ...

to be established between the

coal and the iron, upon which modem industrialism is founded," the
Treaty allowed "political considerations [to] cut disastrously across economic." Finally, the War unleashed economic desires uncommitted to
the productive economy, by revealing that
[iut was not natural for a population, of whom so few enjoyed the comforts of life, to accumulate so hugely. The war has disclosed the possibility of consumption to all and the vanity of abstinence to many. Thus the
bluff is discovered; the laboring classes may be no longer willing to
forego so largely, and the capitalist classes, no longer confident of the
future, may seek to enjoy more fully their liberties of consumption as
long as they last and thus precipitate the hour of their confiscation.6'

Keynes thus characterized the changes in European society after
World War I as the unleashing of a variety of psychological forces
which had been restrained by social "conventions" before the War.
Throughout Keynes' career, this dialectic between taken-for-granted,
"conventional" social forms and their destabilization by psychological

54.
55.
zation).
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 20.
See id. at 3-8 (summarizing how these factors upset Europe's fragile organiId.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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desires served as a key structuring device for his analysis and policy
proposals.
To establish his argument that economic reconstruction should prevail
over political reconstruction, Keynes felt it necessary to show that nationalism did not or should not interfere with economic considerations.
He sought to achieve this in the Economic Consequences in three different ways: by dismissing nationalism as unreal, by despairing over
nationalism's radical incompatibility with economic rationality, and by
reducing nationalism to a transitory emotion, at best an epiphenomenon
of economics. Keynes accomplished each of these different techniques of
excluding nationalism's claims through opposing the irremediably irrational quality of nationalism (whether or not nationalism itself was an enduring phenomenon) to the potentially rational quality of economic
psychology, its potential to heed the dictates of objective imperatives.
This technique permitted Keynes to rely heavily on an objectivist analysis in criticizing the Treaty, despite his opening psychological analysis
of the pre-War European economy. We have already seen examples of
his dismissal of nationalism ("the perils of the future lay not," etc.), and
his despairing over nationalism ("political considerations cut disastrously
across economic").
Keynes' territorial arguments relied mostly on the third, reductionist,
technique. Keynes argued that the international policymakers in Paris
should have deferred to the "natural localisation" '2 of industry in politically reconstructing Central Europe; in particular, they should have preserved as much as possible of the territorial integrity of pre-War Germany, including the Upper Silesian coal fields.63 This argument's reliance
on "natural" economic imperatives stands in contrast both with Economic Consequences' own description of the fragile balance of psychological
forces necessary for a prosperous economy, and, as we shall see, even
more sharply with the later Keynes.' Having absorbed economic psychology into "natural" imperatives, Keynes further argued that nationalist
psychology would evaporate in the face of these imperatives-while acknowledging that the catastrophic alternative was also possible.
Thus, he expressed his position on Upper Silesia by anthropomorphically transferring the notion of ethnicity from human groups to economic regions: Upper Silesia's "population is mixed Polish, German, and
Czechoslovakian . . . . Economically, it is intensely German." Keynes

62.
63.
64.

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES, supra note 9, at 266.
Id.
Id.
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thus implied that such "economic nationality" was more real, or at any
rate more significant, than linguistic or ethnic nationality. International
policymakers should, therefore, have subordinated the ethnically mixed
nature of the population of Upper Silesia to the region's "economic
Germanness." Such subordination would operate under a barely rebuttable presumption that the Upper Silesians ultimately would bend their
nationalism to economic logic; Upper Silesia should remain with Germany "unless the wishes of the inhabitants are decidedly to the
contrary."
Through this reductionist interpretation of nationalism,
Keynes insured that his economic analysis could proceed relatively
objectivistically.
Keynes' arguments about Upper Silesia, placing economic concerns as
the dispositive factor, dovetail with the views of those commentators on
the Versailles system who minimized its recognition of national identity
and saw the state as the central guarantor of European stability. In particular, I refer to those commentators who viewed the interwar Minority
Protection Treaties, imposed by the Allies on the new and greatly expanded states of Central Europe, as temporary in nature.3 For this interpretation, the Treaties were intended to protect the minorities only
during the transitional period required for them to assimilate into a
unified polity, the period necessary for the rationality of state citizenship
to prevail over nationalist passion.67 The 1919 Keynes also viewed ethnic identity as ultimately yielding to rationality, in his case that of the
unity of "natural" economic regions. Presumably, he thought that Germans generally, as well as Upper Silesians, would soon give their common economic "identity" priority over their divided ethnic and linguistic
identities in constructing a new society.
Keynes' position was also strongly statist in its implications. Keynes'
argument about "natural" regions was a historical tautology---the only
reason the regions were "natural" was that political borders, often arising
out of conquest, had shaped the industrial development of those regions.
It was also overbroad in its implications. Given Keynes' emphasis on
pre-War economic interdependence, the only consistent position he could
have taken would have been to call for the abolition of all frontiers.'
Keynes' call for deference to "nature" thus rested on an uncritical ac-

65.

Id. at 264 (emphasis added).

66.

This interpretation was known as the "Mello-Franco Thesis:" See C.A.

MACARTNEY, NATIONAL STATES AND NATIONAL MINORITIES 277 (1934).

67.

Id.

68. , See

MANoUX,

supra note 24 at 32-41.
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ceptance of the political frontiers on the basis of which the European
economy of 1870-1914 had been constructed.
The 1919 Keynes, like the assimilationist commentators, could only
see nationalist passion as an extraneous, wholly irrational factor which
cannot be enlisted in the service of reconstruction but which must either
be somehow subordinated or else acceded to as an undisciplinable, catastrophic, natural force. As Wierzbicki stated, Keynes thought that Upper
Silesia should belong to Poland only if a pro-Poland plebiscite vote
were "powerful and elemental like an avalanche which whirls down and
shows the world the actual will of Silesia." And yet, in his mature
work, it would be precisely the unruly forces of desire that were to be
at the core of Keynes' economic analysis'
Keynes' attack on the powers of the new international authorities set
up by the Treaty also rested on his views about the primacy of economics, including the elevation of economic over legal expertise, and the
exclusion of nationalism from those forces that could be enlisted productively. An aspect of the Versailles Treaty that particularly drew Keynes'
wrath were those provisions relating to the Saar, Danzig, and Upper
Silesia, which some interwar legal writers saw as the highest achievement of the system.7' These regions were subjected to comprehensive
international legal regimes, each constructed through a unique deployment of all of the new legal techniques, self-determination, minority
protection, international administration, and a greatly attenuated notion of
sovereignty.' Keynes declared that the settlements for the Saar and
Danzig were, respectively, "an act of spoliation and insincerity" and a
product of Versailles'subtlest sophisters and most hypocritical draftsmen;" ' we have already seen some of his views on Upper Silesia.
By contrast, for some interwar lawyers, the innovative international
regimes constructed for these regions, these international "experiments,"
merited the highest praise. 4 The regime for the Saar, for example, was
said to be the "incarnation of the [League's] lofty principles,"75 mark-

WIERZBICKI, supra note 4, at 11.
70. See infra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
71.
See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
72. See generally Berman, European Nationalism, supra note 38.
73. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES, supra note 9, at 83, 51-52.
74. Each regime was frequently referred to as an "experiment." See, e.g.,
TEMPERLY, II HISTORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE OF PARIS 183 (1920) (the Saar);
Malcom M. Lewis, The Free City of Danzig, 1924 BYIL 89, 100 (Danzig); GEORGES
KAECKENBEECK, THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERMNT OF UPPER SILESIA (1942).
75.
Monsieur Caclamanos, Report on the Saar Basin, LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFFl-

69.
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ing "an undeniable progress in international legal history." 6 For these
legal writers, the creation of the "experimentalist" regimes epitomized
the achievement of autonomy by a discipline formerly obeisant to sovereignty, an achievement made possible by the entry of nationalism on the
legal stage. 7 For example, Upper Silesia, the basis for the WierzbickiKeynes polemic, was subjected to a particularly complex regime, involving both partition between Poland and Germany and supranational legal
integration in many fields. One of the original motivations for preserving the unity of Upper Silesia, despite partition, was the desire to preserve the economic integrity of the region in response to critiques by
Keynes and others. Nevertheless, the Geneva Convention, which set up
the regime, was directed beyond economics at "affect[ing] the whole life
of that deserving people."
The "crowning" achievements of this regimeP were the new legal
institutions set up to administer and adjudicate it, the Arbitral Tribunal
and the Mixed Commission. These institutions embodied the realization
of the autonomy of legal "experimentalism," autonomous from the contending nationalisms, the antagonistic states, and even from the central
international authority, the "parallelogram of political forces" of the
League of Nations.' These institutions were at once local, yet international, providing a concrete incarnation of the new autonomy of law
made possible and necessary by nationalist disruption. For some legal
writers, only such institutional and doctrinal autonomy for international
law could give productive form to nationalist passion. Keynes' "paradox," the conjuncture of nationalism and autonomous international "experimentation," was, in fact, the ultimate aspiration of this branch of
interwar international law.
While some of these provisions were established after the writing of
the Economic Consequences, Keynes' critique of the new international
authorities established by the Treaty implicitly rejected them in advance.
In A Revision of the Treaty81 , a 1922 postscript to the Economic Consequences, Keynes attacked the intemtional authority responsible for the

c AL JOURNAL,

76.
139-40
77.
sources
78.
79.
80.
81.

Mar. 1920, at 45, 49.

HENRI CouRsiER, LE STATUT INTERNATIONAL DU TERRTORME DE LA SARRE

(1925).
This paragraph summarizes my conclusions in several earlier studies. See
cited, supra note 38.
KAECKENBEECK, supra 74, at 20 (quoting Felix Calonder).
Id. at 27.
Id. at 534.
KEYNEs,

A REVISION OF THE TREATY,

supra note 11.
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Upper Silesia settlement. 2 Keynes stated that the partition frontier
been drawn, "entirely irrespective of economic considerations. 8' 3 in
cordance. with "Wilsonian dogma." 4 Keynes based his critique of
decision on a general challenge to the disciplinary, institutional,
ethnic and national underpinnings of political reconstruction:

had
acthis
and

A good decision can only result by impartial, disinterested, very wellinformed persons taking everything into account. Since international justice
is dealing with vast organic units and not with a multitude of small
units. ... it cannot be the same thing as the cut-and-dried lawyer's justice of the municipal court. It will be a dangerous practice, therefore, to
entrust the settlement of the ancient conflicts now inherent in the tangled
structure of Europe to elderly gentlemen from South America and the far
Asiatic (sic!1 East, who will deem it their duty to extract a strict legal
interpretation from the available signed documents-who will, that is to
say, take account of as few things as possible, in an excusable search for
a simplicity which is not there .... My criticism strikes more deeply
than a mere allegation of partiality. 5
Presumably, the non-lawyer, "impartial, disinterested, and very well-informed persons," would be European experts in the discipline of economic reconstruction.
Similarly, he criticized the Reparations Commission set up by the
Treaty with its large powers of oversight and enforcement. 6 He rejected these powers for their interference by international authorities with
German sovereignty." Moreover, he criticized the underlying motivation
and composition of the Commission, seeing it as an "instrument of
oppression and rapine."' The defects of such a Commission flowed
from its basis in the underlying political conception of the Treaty. Promoting his alternative discipline of reconstruction, Keynes argued that
such a Commission could only be justified if it were transformed into

82.
83.

Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 8.

84.
85.

Id. at 7.
Id. at 7-8.
See ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES, supra note 9, at 208-19 (describing and

86.
criticizing the role of the Reparation Commission).
87. Id. at 216 (complaining that the Commission will be located outside Germany
and yet still have greater power over Germany than the previous Emperor ever pos-

sessed).
88. Id. at 219.
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an "economic council of Europe,"' staffed by experts who were guided
by Keynes' understanding of the central postwar problems.
The task Keynes envisioned for such a Council at this stage was relatively modest. Aside from doing away with the objectionable portions of
the Treaty, such as the huge scale of reparations payments, Keynes'
main remedies for the deficiencies of the Treaty, as set forth in the
Economic Consequences, were the cancelling of inter-allied indebtedness
and the arrangement of an international loan for reconstruction, financed
largely by the U.S 0 The way in which borrowing countries put the
loan to use would be "subject to general, but not detailed, supervision,
by the lending countries."'
To the "paradox" he condemned in the Versailles Treaty, the contradiction that international "experimentation" would come into a perverse alliance with a nationalism partially of its own making, Keynes
contrasted a discipline of economic reconstruction based on "natural"
economic imperatives, respect for state structures, a modest but rational
and expert international economic authority, and the exclusion of nationalism from those forces which can be taken into account in a rational
reconstruction of Europe. Despite his psychological preface, the bulk of
Keynes' criticism of the Treaty neither reconceptualized the object of
economic analysis nor required innovative arguments about the legitimacy of international or state political authority. This entire structure would
change as Keynes developed his own most distinctive insights, integrating psychological instability into the heart of his analysis, an integration
that, by the 1930s, acknowledged the role of nationalism as a force that
could not simply be dismissed or excluded.
Im. NATIONALISM ENLISTED: PLANNING,
"EXPERIMENTATION," AND NATIONALIST LEGITIMACY
In an essay published in July 1933, entitled National Self-Sufficiency,
Keynes declared: "Each year it becomes more obvious that the world is
embarking on a variety of politico-economic experiments, and that different types of experiment appeal to different national temperaments and
historical environments."92 While such an observation may indeed have

89. Id.
90. Id. at 278, 283-87 (arguing that it is impossible for the European allies to
pay the capital and interest of their debts and that the United States must bear the
burden of providing resources for reconstruction).
91. Id. at 287.
92.
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KEYNES, NATIONAL SELF SUFFICENCY (1933)
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seemed "obvious" in the latter part of 1933, an appreciation of the conceptual distance between this essay and the Economic Consequences
requires a rather more complicated explanation. Keynes' overall determination to escape from the "pre-Freudian"93 rationalist optimism of his
pre-war years impelled him to integrate systematically psychological factors into the heart of his economic analysis, thereby advancing beyond
the piecemeal work of the Economic Consequences. Keynes' analysis of
business psychology disclosed the emergence of an autonomous business
"libido," 94 uncommitted to particular investments, the productive economy generally, or national borders. This impulsive, uncommitted business energy meant that deliberate economic policy was indispensable;
nationalism meant that such policy would be nationally specific. Keynes
now accorded nationalism a role both more dangerous and more promising than in his 1919 alternation between despair and dismissal. He saw
transnational business energy both as provoking potentially violent nationalist resentment and as making national "experiments" in economic
planning indispensable for a peaceful world.
In Keynes' 1930s construction of a discipline of economic reconstruction, nationalism thus shifted from the role of the excluded force to that
of a potential ally, or even agent, of reconstruction. Keynes' integration
of psychological factors into the heart of economics made central an
insight adumbrated in his earlier work: economic analysis could not be
separated from cultural and political criticism, nor economic policy from
cultural and political reconstruction. Moreover, even while explicitly
seeking to take account of irrational factors, Keynes' own participation
in general cultural fears, fantasies, and faith heavily marked his conception of economic analysis, economic policy, and internationalism.

NATIONAL SELF SUFFICIENCY, reprinted in XXI THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN

MAYNARD KEYNES 233, 239 (Donald Moggridge ed., 1982) [hereinafter XXI COLLECTED WRITINGS]

93.

See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, MY EARLY BELIEFS (1938) [hereinafter MY

EARLY BELIEFS],

reprinted in X THE COLLECTED WRITINGS

OF JOHN MAYNARD

KEYNES 433, 447-50 (Donald Moggridge ed., 3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter X COLLECTED
WRITINGS] (noting that the pseudo-rational view of human nature led to a thinness, a
superficiality, not only in judgment but also in feeling).
94. JoHN MAYNARD KEYNES, CLIssOLD (1927) [hereinafter CLISSOLD], reprinted
in IX THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 315, 320 (Donald
Moggridge ed., 2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter IX THE COLLECTED WRITINGS].
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A. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS: INVESTMENT "LIBIDO"
AND NATIONALIST RESENTMENT

Keynes' 1930s reflections on nationalism were made possible only by
his ever-increasing integration of psychological factors into the core of
economic analysis. This integration emerged out of his comprehensive
attack on the notion of the economy as a "naturally self-adjusting" system,95 systematically extending the insights foreshadowed in his earlier
work. He criticized the "classical theory" for its inability to explain the
failure of laissez-faire economies to induce economic actors to commit
the amount and kind of resources that would consistently bring out the
economy's full productive potential.' This inability was due to that
theory's assumption of a "calculable future" and its "underestimation of
the concealed factors of utter doubt, precariousness, hope and fear."
Keynes, by contrast, showed how the various psychological forces necessary for a capitalist economy can fail to reach their optimum configuration due, in particular, to the emotional extremes of "paralysis" and "intoxication,"'rs on the one hand, and a fragile conventionalism, on the
other.
In discussing the psychology of investment, Keynes argued that such
"concealed factors" only had emerged in their full autonomy as a result
of modem social and economic developments. Once again, Keynes constructed an image of a time before the modem release of autonomous
psychological forces, although his new understanding of economic development led him to invent a somewhat different explanation than that of
the "double bluff" of the Economic Consequences. Keynes now por-

95. See generally, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE END OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE (1926)
[hereinafter THE END OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE], reprinted in IX COLLECrED WRrImNGS, supra note 94, at 272.
96. GENERAL THEORY, supra 32, at 25-26.
97. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENr (1937)
[hereinafter EiLOYMENT], reprinted in XIV THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN
MAYNARD KEYNES 109, 122 (Moggridge ed., 1973).
98. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF CHANGES IN
THE VALUE OF MONEY (1923), reprinted in IX COLLECTED WRrrINGS, supra note 94,
at 59, 74 (using these metaphors in an early essay on nlonetary policy).
99. In particular, the aspect of the "double bluff" concerned with the voluntary
restriction of consumption and the willingness to accept lower wages were incompatible with Keynes' new views about the negative consequences of insufficient demand.
See GENERAL THEORY, supra note 32, at 373; II ROBERT SKIDELSKY, JOHN
MAYNARD KEYNES, TE ECONOMIST AS SAVIOR, 1920-1937 238 (1992).
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trayed "former times, when enterprises were mainly owned by those
who undertook them or by their friends and associates"; in such a society, "investment depended on a sufficient supply of individuals of sanguine temperament and constructive impulses who embarked on business
as a way of life, not really relying on a precise calculation of prospective profit."" The commitment of investment energy to the productive
economy was guaranteed by this "way of life" and such decisions were
largely "irrevocable."'' In those "former times," full employment, the
full commitment of psychological and material resources to the economy, was a product of the culture of "constructive impulses," rather
putatively automatic adjustment mechanisms, such as the interest
than of
02
rate.
This integrated "way of life," however, had largely been replaced by
a segmentation of the economic process. For Keynes, the level of employment is determined by "effective demand," composed of consumption demand and investment demand. 3 These demands are, in turn,
strongly influenced by three "fundamental psychological factors, namely,
the psychological propensity to consume, the psychological attitude to
liquidity, and the psychological expectation of future yield from capital
assets."' The disappearance of the conventional unity of the erstwhile
"way of life" meant that the various kinds of human desire involved in
the economic process could now operate according to their own internal
dynamics in determining the level of demand. 5
Keynes argued that "given the psychology of the public, the level of
output and employment as a whole depends on the amount of investment," since "it is usual in a complex system to regard as the causa
causans that factor which is most prone to sudden and wide fluctuation."' Much of Keynes' psychological analyses, therefore, focused on
GENERAL THEORY, supra 32, at 150; cf. ATHOL FITZGIBBONS, KEYNES' VI84 (1988) (commenting on this culture of "constructive impulses"). Commentators on Keynes' views on uncertainty differ on the extent to which he thought decisions lacked an ultimate rational grounding. For two polar views, compare G.L.S.

100.

SION

SHACKLE, KEYNESIAN KALEinIcs: THE EVOLUTION OF A GENERAL POLITICAL ECONO-

MY 37-47 (1974) with

CODDINGTON,

supra 42, at 50-65. For a convenient summary

of the range of views, see II ROBERT SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE

ECONOMIST AS SAVIOR, 1920-1937 82-89 (1992).
101.

GENERAL THEORY, supra note 32, at 150.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See id. at 150.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 246-47.
Id. at 31.
EMPLOYMENT, supra note 97, at 121. Keynes viewed the propensity to con-
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the two "fundamental factors" that directly affected investment: 1) the

attitude toward holding money as an alternative to investment, or "liquidity preference"''

7

and 2) the expectation of future yield of capital

assets, which determines the "schedule of the marginal efficiency of
capital."' '
The increasing separation of ownership and
management,' °9 and the consequent disjunction of investment decisions

from entrepreneurial decisions, played a crucial role in augmenting the
role of these psychological switching points.

These two "fundamental factors" affect investment demand because
the rate of interest compared to prospective profits determines that demand. For Keynes, the rate of interest is a "measure of the unwilling-

ness of those who possess money to part with their liquid control over
it."' This "unwillingness," "liquidity preference," or "propensity to
hoard,"'

reflects:

our desire to hold money ... [which] is a barometer of the degree of
our own distrust of our own calculations concerning the future. Even
though this feeling about money is itself conventional or instinctive, it
operates, so to speak at a deeper level of our motivation. It takes charge
at the 2moments when the higher, more precarious conventions have weakened.'

Economic uncertainty means that the "deep" psychological impulses
underlying liquidity preference will have many occasions on which to
defeat the "higher conventions" and restrain investment." '3 Keynes de-

clared that this ardent "love of money" was destined to furnish the
sume, and, as a result, consumption demand, as relatively stable. Consumption increased with income, but always somewhat less than the increase in income. The
proportion of income devoted to consumption tended to decrease as incomes rose. A
government interested in increasing productive activity could, therefore, use this psychological tendency to increase consumption by redistributive policies in favor of
those with lower incomes.
107.

GENERAL THEORY, supra note 32, at 166.

108. Id. at 135. More precisely, the marginal efficiency of the capital is "that rate
of discount which would make the present value of the series of annuities given by
the returns expected from the capital asset during its life equal to its supply price."
109. Id. at 150.
110. Id. at 167.
111.

Id. at 174.

112. EMPLOYMNT, supra note 97, at 116.
113. To be sure, this "pathological" element of the rate of interest could be affected-moderated or aggravated-by convention: the rate of interest is not only affected by the "deep" psychological attachment to money, but also by the "prevailing
view of what its value is expected to be." GENERAL THEORY, supra note 32, at 203.
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subject matter of pathology, rather than of economics." 4 This restraint
on investment, pleasure, and creativity" 5 was deeply rooted in "the opprobrium of two centuries of moralists and economists" who clung to
the "virtuous" doctrine of the importance of the "utmost of thrift.""' 6
The schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital is determined by
the psychological dynamics of two kinds of investors, the entrepreneur
and the professional investor. In deciding to plunge forward in enterprise, as well as to retrench, investors act under conditions of great uncertainty. At best, investors come to depend on a set of "conventions."" 7 Yet,
[m]ost, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only
be taken as a result of animal spirits-of a spontaneous urge to action
rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of
quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities." 8
For Keynes, exuberant "animal spirits" thus provided the healthy energy
to defeat the morbid liquidity preference." 9 This instinctual dimension
also meant "not only that slumps and depressions are exaggerated in
degree but that economic prosperity is excessively dependent on a political and social atmosphere which is congenial to the average business
man.' 20 The "nerves and hysteria and even the digestions and reactions to the weather" of investors could upset the "delicate balance of
spontaneous optimism."'' Like Freud, with whose works he was highly familiar,' Keynes saw civilization's conventions as a "thin and

114.

JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR GRANDCHILDREN

(1930), reprinted in IX THE COLLECTED WRITINGS, supra note 94, at 321, 329.
115.

Id. at 328-30.

116.
117.

GENERAL THEORY, supra note 32, at 362.
Id. at 152.

118.
119.

Id. at 161 (emphasis added).
Compare FrrzGIBBONS, supra note 100, at 84-86 with Ted Winslow, Keynes

and Freud: Psychoanalysis and Keynes' Account of the "Animal Spirits" of Capital-

ism, 53 Soc. RES. 549 (1986) [hereinafter Keynes and Freud] (offering contrasting
views of Keynes' "animal spirits").
120. GENERAL THEORY, supra note 32, at 162.
121.

Id.

122. Ted Winslow has written extensively on Keynes' familiarity with Freud's
works and the parallel between Keynes' ideas and those of psychoanalysis, although
direct evidence of "influence" is inconclusive. See, e.g., Ted Winslow, Psychoanalysis
and Keynes' Account of the Psychology of the Trade Cycle in THE PHILOSOPHY AND
ECONOMICS OF J.M. KEYNES 212 (Bill Gerrard & John Hillard eds., 1992); Ted
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precarious crust" erected over irrational instincts.'" An ongoing struggle between the "deep" impulses of "liquidity preference," on the one
hand, and "animal spirits," on the other, 4 constantly buffeted the
"precarious," conventional, business personality.
A different set of psychological dynamics is unleashed by the creation
of an autonomous field of professional investment, especially in its extreme form--that of speculation. Professional investors are driven less
by the vicissitudes of "animal spirits" than by their own analyses of
"mass psychology,"'" the "mass" in question that of other investors. In
other words, they seek to anticipate the psychological predictions of
other investors, to anticipate "what general opinion anticipates that general opinion to be," anticipation to "the third degree."'"
Given this dependence of the marginal efficiency of capital schedule
on the instinctual vicissitudes of "animal spirits" and on the hyper-reflexive conventionalism of the securities markets, it is no surprise that
Keynes viewed it as potentially unstable:
Action based on so flimsy a foundation is liable to sudden and violent
changes. The practice of calmness and immobility, of certainty and security, suddenly breaks down. New fears and hopes will, without warning,
take charge of human conduct. The forces of disillusion may suddenly
impose a new conventional basis of valuation .... At all times the
vague panic fears and equally vague and unreasoned hopes are not really
lulled, and lie but a little way below the surface."
Despite the presence of a variety of stabilizing factors,' the emergence of autonomous psychological dynamics in the economic process
leads to a release of unpredictable, surplus energy which is not sufficiently bound to production. As Keynes commented about "business men
[sic]" in one of his non-technical essays:

Winslow, Bloomsbury, Freud, and the Vulgar Passions, 57 Soc. RES. 785 (1990);
Keynes and Freud, supra note 119; see also JEAN-JOSEPH GOux. LES
ICONOCLASMS 101-13 (1978) (examining Keynes and psychoanalysis).
123. MY EARLY BELIEFS, supra note 93, at 447.

124. For example, Freud wrote of the control exercised by the ego over the id's
instincts as "more a matter of form than of fact" and saw the ego as "a poor creature owing service to three masters." SIG TUND FREUD. THE EGO AND THE ID 45-46
(Joan Riviere trans., 1960).
125. GENERAL THEORY, supra note 32, at 155.

126.

Id. at 156.

127.

EMPLOYMENT, supra

128.

note 97, at 114-15.
GENERAL THEORY, supra note 32, at 162-64.
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They lack altogether the kind of motive, the possession of which, if they
had it, could be expressed by saying that they had a creed . . . . That is
why . . . they fall back on the grand substitute motive, the perfect ersatz,

the anodyne for those who, in fact, want nothing at all-money ....
[They] flutter about the world seeking something to which they can attach

their abundant libido. But they have not found it. They would like to be
apostles. But they cannot. They remain business men.'"
For Keynes, investors are marked by this paradoxical surplus libido,
both fickle and perversely inflexible, both "paralyzed" and "intoxicated,"
the desire that "wants nothing" and yet invests itself, both emotionally
and financially, in the "ersatz," rather than in the real. 3 ' The chief
problem for Keynes was thus how to bind investment "libido" to the
"real," productive economy and to secure the loyalty to that economy of
the "loose"'' energies formerly concealed by the bygone "way of
life."'3 The newly autonomous business "libido" is neither necessarily
tied to the productive economy (it "wants nothing") nor to a particular
society (it "flutters about the world").' 33 The flip side of this
untrustworthiness is its making a "fetish of liquidity."' 34 This "fetish"
is one of the ways business people attempt to assuage the "vague panic
fears" that stem from their "abundant libido,"'35 or, in the words of a
contemporary
psychoanalyst, from their "drive economy in want of an
36
1

object.'

This recognition of the importance and danger of the mobile, yet
rigid, "abundant libido" of investors provides a crucial link between
Keynes' general economic analysis and his consideration of the role of
nationalism in economic crisis. Keynes' changing position on free
trade 37 provides a useful thread by which to follow his integration of
129. CLISSOLD, supra note 94, at 320.
130. See supra note 122 (noting works in which Ted Winslow has written extensively on the parallel between psychoanalysis and Keynes and the possible influence
of the former on the latter)
131.
"Loose" was a metaphor frequently used by Keynes for mobile capital. See,
e.g., JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, POST-WAR CURRENCY POLICY (1941), reprinted in
XXV THE COLLECTED WRrTNGS OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES: SHAPING THE POSTWAR WORLD: THE CLEARING UNION 21, 31 (Donald Moggridge ed., 1980) ("Loose
funds may sweep around the world disorganizing all steady business").
132. CLISSOLD, supra note 94, at 316.
133. Id. at 320.
134. GENERAL THEORY, supra note 32, at 155.
135.
CLISSOLD, supra note 94, at 320.
136. JULIA KRISTEVA, PowERs OF HORROR 35 (Leon Roudiez trans., 1982).
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See generally Hugo Radice, Keynes and the Policy of Practical Protectionism,
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such factors into his analysis. In 1923, he had declared that "[w]e must
hold to Free Trade, in its widest interpretation, as an inflexible dogma,
to which no exception is admitted."'" He reasoned that long-term considerations militated for such a policy, even if temporary economic
advantage could be had through infringing on free trade in particular
cases: "For if pressure of population is to lead to a regime of armed
and powerful nations grabbing resources from weak holders, our last
state will be worse than it ever can be under any alternative policy."'"
In the Thirties, Keynes declared that his prior, absolutist support of
free trade was a relic of the "mental habits of the pre-war nineteenth
century world,"''
with its rationalism, optimism, and universalism.
Keynes now associated the free trade dogma with the theory of laissezfaire: since, for that theory, the economy would always self-adjust at an
optimum level of investment, international trade policy was a waste of
time."4 Extending his attack on laissez-faire to the international level,
Keynes argued that free trade and international capital mobility would
heighten the dangers intrinsic to the modem economy. The mobility of
capital would internationally amplify the "remoteness between ownership
and operation [that] is an evil in the relations between men."'" Such
"remoteness" can lead to an "intolerable"' 4 3 lack of reciprocal responsibility and trust between investors and managers of different nationalities. Such "excessive entanglement between nations,"'" heightening the
dangerous autonomy of economic psychology, could yield "strains and
enmities" and, ultimately, war." Nationalist resentment and transnational capital untrustworthiness are thus perils inherent in the modem
capitalist process.
In fact, we need look no further than Keynes' own writings to find
examples of the rhetoric of nationalist resentment of transnational capital
mobility prevalent in the interwar period. Keynes' anxious obsession
with the unbound "libido" of transnational "business men" led him to
magnify its power, to condemn the "decadent international but individu-

in J.M. KEYNES IN RETROSPECT 153 (John Hillard ed., 1988).
138. John Maynard Keynes, The Underlying Principles,THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN COMMERCIAL, SuPPLEErr 717, 717-18, Jan. 4, 1923.
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140.
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Id. at 235-7.

supra note 32, at 339.

supra

note 92, at

236.

646

AM. U. J. INTL L. & POL'Y

[VOL. 10:2

alistic capitalism in the hands of which we found ourselves after the
war.' 46 Writing about Germany in 1926, Keynes favorably compared
the nationalism and anti-semitism of the Right with the "accommodations with international finance and Red Russians" of the Left.'47 The
obsession with the power and "decadence" of transnational capital, usually with an anti-semitic content, was a recurrent theme of European
right wing rhetoric from the end of the nineteenth century at least
through World War IIH-and has resurfaced today. 49
While Keynes associated the double characteristics of fetishistic inflexibility and transnational fickleness with capital, some interwar legal
theorists viewed this psychological complex as typical of nationalism.
Both the economic analyst and his legal counterparts saw the chief dangers of such forces in their lack of loyalty to constructive social forms,
whether those of the economy or the state. Legal theorists as diverse as
Dietrich Schindler and Hans Kelsen attributed nationalism's danger to
the state system to these contradictory attributes of immobility and capriciousness. 5 For example, Kelsen declared, on the one hand, that
nationalism provided an excessively rigid investment of loyalty: "a racial
bond between members of different states forms, or at any rate can
form, an infinitely closer tie than legal membership of the same
state."'' On the other hand, he wrote that nationalism was evanescent,
"like waves in the sea and after a brief space . . . lost again in an everchanging ebb and flow."'5 These contradictory attributes threatened to
"cause [the State] inevitably to fall headlong into a bottomless pit of
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economic, religious and national antagonisms."'' 3 For Kelsen, the only
solution was a "pure theory of law," utterly detached from such "sociological"' 54 considerations; other interwar lawyers expressed confidence that international law could theoretically and practically channel
the potentially anarchic, border-defying forces of nationalism into pacific
' The problem of disciplining fickle, yet inflexible, libidilegal forms. 55
nal forces was thus a shared cultural structure of interwar social thought,
whose terms could shift from one discourse to another. Nationalism
could sometimes play the role of the binder of trans-border business
forces, while at other times it could play the role of a destabilizing
trans-border force which only a firm international authority could discipline.
I now turn to Keynes' policy proposals, in which the need to cope
with the unruly forces of both nationalism and the economy intersect.
B.

ECONOMIC POLICY: "HARNESSING" INVESTMENT
AND NATIONALIST LEGITIMACY

As he elaborated the economic planning he viewed as indispensable
for economic prosperity in the Thirties, Keynes came to see nationalism
both as an indispensable element in shaping the locus, scope, and content of policy, as well as an unavoidable factor in securing legitimacy
for policy. The General Theory may give the impression that Keynes'
vision was of "the good life brought within reach of all under the benevolent guidance of a Platonic,"'" or at least a technocratic, state.
His other writings of the Thirties, however, show that he took account
of passionate psychological forces such as nationalism, as well as rational inquiry and technocratic expertise, in his notion of state planning.
Keynes declared repeatedly during the Thirties that the only way to
accomplish his goal of disciplining impulsive economic forces was
through innovative "experiments."'" In "National Self-Sufficiency,"
Keynes argued that the outcome of such "experiments" was neither
guaranteed in advance nor necessarily universalizable.
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We each have our own fancy. Not believing we are saved already, we
each would like to have a try at working out our own salvation. We do
not wish, therefore, to be at the mercy of world forces working out, or
trying to work out some uniform equilibrium according to the ideals of
laissez-faire capitalism. 5
Such passages dramatically shift the relationship between economic
forces and nationalism from that presented in the Economic Consequences. Rejecting laissez-faire's misplaced reliance on "the mercy of world
forces," Keynes now viewed economic forces as in need of deliberate
policy interventions; by contrast, nationalism, no longer the excluded
irrational, is now accorded the role of one of the shapers of the
particularistic "fancy" or "salvation" which is to guide those economic
forces. Rather than advocating a universalist technocracy, Keynes' new
appreciation of nationalism led to his acceptance of a multiplicity of
"experimentalist" policy schemes.
Keynes' policy recommendations in the Thirties should be interpreted
in light of this altered configuration between economic and nationalist
psychology. The most familiar of his proposals to deal with the
autonomization of business libido are those typically "Keynesian" measures concerning direct state involvement: "I expect to see the State,
which is in a position to calculate the marginal efficiency of capitalgoods on long views and on the basis of the general social advantage,
taking an ever greater responsibility for organizing investment."'5 9 An
"optimum rate of investment" will only be secured by a "somewhat
comprehensive socialization of investment. '' "W This social organization
of investment could and should intervene in the psychological dynamics
released by the modem form of capitalism, restraining the dangerous instincts, while encouraging those conducive to full employment to develop into a healthy form.
The efficacy of such intervention would depend on the form and
extent of the "somewhat comprehensive socialization." Ideally, Keynes
sought to increase the stock of capital so that it ceases to be scarce,
thus eventually bringing about the "euthanasia of the rentier."'' This
situation would allow the healthy instincts driving the entrepreneur, the
"spontaneous optimism" of their "animal spirits," to develop without
entanglement with the psychological and economic demands of the
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rentiers. The proclivities of the "financier, the entrepreneur et hoc genus
omne (who are so fond of their craft that their labor could be obtained
much cheaper than at present)" will "be harnessed to the service of the
community on reasonable terms of reward."'6'
Like the interwar lawyers discussed above who saw in the creation of
autonomous legal institutions the crowning achievement of the Versailles
system, Keynes sought to give the new policy powers to "semi-autonomous" economic institutions.'" Like the lawyers' local, yet international, institutions, these autonomous bodies of experts would derive their
powers from political bodies but their "criterion of action within their
own field" would be "solely the public good as they understand it."'"4
Only such new "separate autonomies"' would be able to fully articulate the innovative policy proposals of the new economics by understanding and "harnessing" the unleashed psychological forces. If such
institutions may be characterized as technocracy, it is clearly of a highly
sophisticated, psychologically and culturally informed variety. The
Keynesian autonomous expert, who provides the necessary insight into
the "precariousness" of the conventional business personality and its
inability to productively "harness" its "propensities," resembles the
Freudian superego, which "knew more than the ego about the unconscious id."'
Yet, even this complex expertise is subject to nationalist legitimation.
Each nation must be able to work out its "own salvation" in accordance
with its own "national temperament and historical environment."'" For
Keynes, control over investment was the key to the shaping of the economy; "[a]bove all," he therefore declared, "let finance be primarily national."'" The national control of finance and, in general, "the policy
of increased national self-sufficiency is to be considered not as an ideal
in itself but as directed to the creation of an environment in which other

162.

Id. at 376-77. If political difficulties prevent such a "comprehensive socializa-

tion," the state could provide a set of "non-comprehensive" "inducements to invest"-such as Keynes' whimsical suggestion that the state bury bank-notes and leave
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ideals can be safely and conveniently pursued"'--the ideals of particular national visions of "salvation."
To be sure, Keynes often used technocratic language, as in his claim
that planning would affect only the "volume, not the direction"'70 of
investment. Nonetheless, it is difficult both to see how this could be
possible as well as to reconcile such statements with his many declarations about the uses to which public expenditure should be put. His own
view of "salvation" included such statements as: "A country which cannot afford art or agriculture, invention or tradition, is a country in which
one cannot afford to live."'' In any case, the new emphasis placed on
conscious "experimentation" meant that such questions, particularly those
relating to national autonomy, would be subject to public debate and
political legitimacy: "if the functions and purposes of the state are to
be ... enlarged, the decision as to what, broadly speaking, shall be
produced within the nation and what shall be exchanged with, must
stand high amongst the objects of policy."'"
Keynes' analysis of the role of nationalism in economic "experimentation" implied a drastic shift in approaching the kinds of territorial issues
he had considered in 1919. In the Economic Consequences,7 3 as we
saw, Keynes argued that the reconstructors of Europe at the Paris Peace
Conference should have made their territorial decisions in deference to
"natural" economic regions; he further implied that nationalist passions
were either ephemeral or, in any event, must be bypassed if one sought
to achieve a rational economic policy. Keynes' systematic critique of the
"naturalness" of economic processes and his stress on the role of policy
authorities in activating and channelling economic forces implied a rejection of both of these notions. Rather than deferring to the "natural
localisation of industry," Keynes now declared that state policy should
engage in the "deliberate planning of the localisation of industry."''7
He further maintained that technical developments had minimized the
economic benefits of international specialization. 75 Modem conditions
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meant that economic technique, concerned with the conceptual problem
of the "general organization of resources,"' 76 rather than material factors, had become the key to prosperity.
If the economy is not a self-adjusting entity, if one cannot analyze
the economy in isolation from the actions or omissions of policy authorities, then one cannot simply defer to a "natural economy" in determining the political map. Instead, one must consider the relative efficacy
and legitimacy of various possible loci of policy authority and of the
authority to construct the economy through "deliberate planning." In the
Thirties, this consideration meant that the territorial limits of nationalist
legitimacy must be a primary consideration in determining the frontiers
of economic units, or, what for the Thirties' Keynes amotnted to the
same thing, the frontiers of economic experimentation. Nationalism is
thus no longer a simple hindrance, to be ignored if possible, but a key
consideration in deciding where to situate policy authority and, thereby,
how to create economic regions. Indeed, due to the importance of psychological factors in economic processes, the legitimacy of that authority
is intrinsically related to its efficacy. Keynes may have concluded that
internationalism must again defer to existing state frontiers-but now it
is in deference to "nationalist temperament," rather than to "natural"
economic imperatives.
I conclude this section with a less familiar proposal in the General
Theory for dealing with the commitment to the economy of psychological investment energy. Keynes suggested binding such energy directly,
by giving the individual no alternative other than either "consuming his
income" or "ordering the production of [a] specific capital asset.'""
Explicitly emphasizing the "libidinal" quality of the binding, Keynes
contemplated ending speculation by making investment decisions "permanent and indissoluble, like marriage, except by reason of death or
other grave cause."" Such an irrevocable marriage would defeat the
"fetish of liquidity"'" and forestall the irresponsibility latent in the
modem "divorce"'80 between ownership and management.
One can see the convergence of economic and cultural criticism latent
in such metaphors by associating Keynes' analysis with discourses
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whose concerns were focused on the literal meaning of the terms used
by Keynes-and whose striking structural similarity to Keynes' analysis
highlights the general cultural matrix within which his work should be
placed. Two recent studies have analyzed interwar discussions of cultural
crisis that focused on the purported confusion of gender roles by the
war in both France and Britain. 8' Many British observers viewed the
war as responsible for the release of sexual energy, particularly aggressive sexual energy in British men.' Some of these observers viewed
this release as a liberation from the hypocritical sexual morality of Victorian society; 83 their goal, therefore was not to repress this energy,
but to provide a healthy "outlet"'84 for it in marriage. These new technocrats of desire, the "sexologists and sex reformers," sought to create a
reformed institution of marriage by emphasizing the importance of "mutual, pleasurable sexual experiences," which would in turn "reduc[e] the
threat of war by removing the sexual repressions and tensions, that ...
helped to bring it about."'8 5 Thus, "British society sought in the establishment of harmonious martial relationships a resolution to the anxieties
and political turmoil caused by the Great War."' 86 French writers formulated analogous rhetoric concerning the purported release of female
sexual energy by the war, often focusing on motherhood as possessing
the power to turn "modem women" back into "real women."'87
Keynes' proposal to "harness" the newly autonomous investment
libido by "marrying" it to investment may be viewed as forming a series with these other discourses of reconstruction. In a manner structurally similar to those who sought to "reconstruct gender," Keynes proclaimed that his era was marked by a freeing up of desiring energy, that
energy was at once responsible for social crisis and yet potentially revitalizing, and that the crisis could be resolved by new policies and institutions that would bind that energy in socially "productive" forms.
Keynes sought not to "transform" human nature, but to "manage" it, to
"canalize" potentially "dangerous human proclivities"' 88 into the productive economy.
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Moreover, Keynes contended that his various proposals for coordinating economic forces would also have the effect of minimizing conflicts
between nations. Under a system of laissez-faire and the gold standard,
the only method for governments to "mitigate economic distress at
home" was "through the competitive search for markets," or, in other
words, through "forcing sales on foreign countries and restricting purchases."' 89 However, "if nations can learn to provide themselves with
full employment with their domestic policy ... there need be no important economic forces calculated to set one country against its neighbors."'" Like the "reconstructors of gender," Keynes sought to pacify
the aggressive potential of newly autonomous "forces" by binding them
to the "domestic" economy.
C. NATIONAL DISCIPLINE AND INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION

While Keynes' Thirties' discipline of economic reconstruction was
influenced by his appreciation of nationalism, he both retained his cosmopolitan aspirations and reflected on the impact of international developments on national experiments. As a cosmopolitan spirit, Keynes'
appreciation of the importance and irreducibility of nationalism led him
to sympathize with all of the new "experiments."
It may be that other countries will enjoy the rare opportunity of seeing
thred experiments carried on simultaneously... the Five Year Plan in
Russia; the Corporative state in Italy; and state planning by Public Corporations responsible to a democracy in Great Britain. And as lovers of our
species, let us hope that they will all be successful.""'
Keynes' main criterion for supporting such experiments in the early
Thirties was that they provide a stimulus to remedy the disastrous drop
in demand that led to the general economic crisis."g He was relatively
agnostic about the form of this stimulus.
The appropriate stimulus will vary from nation to nation; in some a relief
from taxation, in some a programme of public works, in some an expansion of public credit, in some a relaxation of exchange and import restrictions, in some a repayment of pressing debts, in some the mere removal
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190. Id. at 382.
191.
STATE PLANNING, supra note 174, at 92.
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of anxieties and fear, in some the mere stimulus to the lords of business
to be courageous and active again.'93
Nevertheless, due to balance of payments pressure that arises when
governments pursue domestic expansion in the face of world economic
downturn, "combined international action is of the essence of policy."' 94 Keynes proposed to achieve simultaneous international expansion in a manner which would respect the diversity of the experiments,
in keeping with his agnostic attitude about their form. The plan was to
"print gold," say five billion dollars worth, and to distribute it to national governments according to some formula. 95 After all, "we have long
1
printed gold nationally. Why should we not print it internationally?'
Participation in the scheme would be made contingent on a commitment
by countries to "abate certain unsound international practices" such as
exchange restrictions and "tariffs and quotas ... not in pursuance of
permanent national policies.' 97
Keynes' striking plan was designed for its psychological impact, as
well as its technical effects, in keeping with his ever-present awareness
of the intertwining of psychology and economics: "Our plan must be
spectacular, so as to change the grey complexion of men's minds."'9 8
Indeed, the plan itself presupposed Keynes' unmasking of the "fetishism" underlying the desire to hold money. In particular, Keynes had
explicitly referred to Freud's explanations of the instinctual basis for the
sacred status of gold.' 99 If gold and gold-backed money were merely a
"fetish" without an original, an "ersatz" without a real, then deliberate
policy might induce its devotees to transfer their passion to "printed
gold." A fetish of this kind can be substituted by another fetish, assuming political authority is able to imbue it "with the same symbolic
weight." ' The steadily disintegrating international community, however, was not up to the task. The World Economic Conference to which
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Keynes had addressed his proposal adjourned inconclusively and only
"national experiments" were left.
The Thirties' Keynes maintained a relatively minimal role for the
international dimension, as an encourager of national experimentation.
This role was not unlike that he foresaw for the international dimension
in the Economic Consequences. Keynes remained an internationalist in
the cultural realm--the realm of "[ildeas, knowledge, art, hospitality,
travel"-and a supporter, however critical, of a wide diversity of nationalist "politico-economic experiments." Yet, in view of the strong
social and cultural significance he attributed to economic experimentation, this internationalism seems rather weak. As in the Economic Consequences, Keynes would have the international defer to states, but now
it is due to their nationalist legitimacy, rather than their reflection of
"natural" economic regions. Such emphasis on toleration of pluralist
"experimentation" can be easily explained as one of the positions one
might have taken in response to the international context of the Thirties.
Despite proposals whose potential would blossom in the following decade,' Keynes did not, at this stage, imagine a more vigorous role
for international "experimentation."
IV. NATIONALISM DISCIPLINED: THE INTERNATIONALIST
PARADOX OF THE FORTIES
In 1941, Keynes responded to a demand that he choose between
internationalist and nationalist approaches to post-World War II reconstruction by replying, "I must pursue both lines of thought...
both."'' 3 Keynes' subsequent role as the key British figure in the preparation for Bretton Woods meant that his formulations from this period
tend to clear and pragmatic positions, rather than speculative explorations of alternatives. The dominant tendency of his work at this time
should be interpreted as a synthesis between the aspiration for international coordination and preservation of British prerogatives. Nevertheless,
other strands in his work envisioned a greater role for international authority in the disciplining of both economics and nationalism. In these
latter strands, Keynes saw nationalism as requiring, and amenable to, the
same kind of innovative policy discipline as other psychological forces,
201. NATIONAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY, supra note 92, at 236.
202. One commentator saw Keynes' Thirties' "printed gold" proposals as containing "many features of the International Monetary Fund:' R. F. HARROD, THm LIFE OF
JoHN MAYNARD KEYNES 444 (1963).
203. Id. at 526.
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like those underlying investment. From the role of the excluded irrational of 1919, to that of an agent of "experimental" policy in the Thirties,
nationalism moved in such reflections to the same level of
disciplinability as other, more strictly "economic," forces.
Without describing the detail of Keynes' Forties proposals, one can
summarize his goal as the establishment of a comprehensive international framework for encouraging investment, aimed "at the substitution of
an expansionist, in place of a contractionist, pressure on world
trade." '
Keynes' proposed International Clearing Bank would have
"generalize[d] the essential principle of banking"2 5 by providing a
mechanism whereby countries with trade deficits could make use of the
resources left idle by surplus countries, substituting "a credit mechanism
in place of hoarding." 2' Early versions of these proposals would have
provided international enforcement of Keynesian virtue by providing a
variety of sanctions against maintaining excessive creditor balances in
the Bank, including required revaluation of national currency and the
transfer of balances in excess of a stipulated amount to the Bank's "Reserve Fund,"2 7 a fund to be used for a variety of international purposes. Moreover, excessive creditor countries would be required to "discuss" with the Bank such measures as expansion of domestic demand
and foreign development loans, although they would not be forced to
implement them.20 ' Such proposals would enlist states in the service of
international expansion, "putting at least as much pressure of adjustment
on the creditor country as on the debtor."'
Keynes sought to accompany such constraints on selfish nationalist
actions by states with control of the transnational mobility of private
capital, one of his constant preoccupations. He wished to give policy
authorities the means of
distinguishing-

204. JOHN M. KEYNES, PROPOSALS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CLEARING UNION
(1942) [hereinafter CLEARING UNION], reprinted in XXI COLLECTED WRITINGS (1980),
supra note 92, at 168, 176.
JOHN M. KEYNES, PROPOSALS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY UNION
205.
(1941) [hereinafter CURRENCY UNION], reprinted in XXI COLLECTED WRITINGS (ed.,
1980), supra note 93, at 42, 44.
206. CLEARING UNION, supra note 204, at 177.
207. KEYNES, PROPOSALS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY UNION (1941), reprinted in XXV COLLECTED WRITINGS note 95, at 33, 36-37.
208. CLEARING UNION, supra note 204, at 175.
209. CURRENCY UNION, supra note 204, at 42, 48-49.
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(a) between movements of floating funds and genuine new investment for
developing the world's resources; and
(b) between movements, which will help to maintain equilibrium, from
surplus countries, to deficiency countries and speculative movements or
flights
out of deficiency countries or from one surplus country to anoth0
21

er.

Keynes proposed to achieve such control of capital movements through
a "uniform multilateral agreement," 2t ' thereby enlisting states in the
service of the international control of this "loose" investment energy.
Since such control would only be effective if exercised "at both
2 2 of all transactions, these measures would work only if all
ends""
members of his proposed International Clearing Union adopted similar
controls. The multilateral agreement, therefore, presupposed that "the
central control of capital movements would be a "permanent feature of
' 213
the post-war system.
Many of these proposals were consistent with the "practical protectionist" spirit of Keynes' Thirties' "national self-sufficiency" program 2 4 As one commentator argues, the Keynesian approach is "to
restore public control over international liquidity, so that national governments can in turn regain control over their own domestic monetary
systems."2 5 This interpretation would stress Keynes' ultimate judgment
that the method and degree of capital controls be left to state discretion." 6 In a speech to the House of Lords, Keynes advocated the imposition of such controls by Britain on the grounds that otherwise "we
lose control over our domestic rate of interest."2' 7 Moreover, defending
the British position in negotiations with the Americans, Keynes insisted
that the role of the proposed "Stabilization Fund" be "passive," a "reserve resource" which would not "study the advisability of every transaction,"" and would leave considerable autonomy in the hands of national banks.219 These passages support the notion that Keynes sought
210. Id. at 53.
211. Id. at 52.
212. CLEARING UNION, supra note 204, at 185.
213. CURRENCY UNION, supra note 205, at 52.
214. See generally, Hugo Radice, Keynes and the Policy of Practical Protectionism, in J.M. KEYNES IN RETROSPECT 153 (John Hillard ed., 1988).
215. Id. at 169.
216. CLEARING UNION, supra note 204, at 186.
217. JOHN M. KEYNES, ADDRESS BEFORE THE HOUSE OF LORDS (May 18, 1943),
reprinted in XXV COLLECTED WRrrINGS (ed., 1980), supra note 92, at 269, 275.
218. HARROD, supra note 204, at 570.
219. JOHN M. KEYNES, THE MAIN OBJECnVES OF THE PLAN (hereinafter "IrE
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augmented international authority only to the extent necessary to secure
national autonomy. Keynes' reluctance to give more discretionary power
to international institutions may have resulted both from his skepticism
about their expertise and about their adopting the expansionist approach
as their guide to policy.2 '
However, this tendency in Keynes' Forties formulations contends with
other, more visionary, facets of his thinking that advocated even stronger
international authority and political restructuring. He described his own
plan as different than that of the Americans in that it embodied an unequivocal "general intention," that is, to be economically "expansionist.""22 In contrast with the American proposal, Keynes' plan was more
creative (the creation of international credit),222 centralized (the requirement that "exchanged transactions be centralized with the Clearing Bank
through national controls"),2" disciplined (the provision of the "means
of disciplining a creditor country"), 4 and vigilant (the assumption of
"prior scrutiny of all [capital] transactions"). 2" Moreover, Keynes
envisioned the use of the International Clearing Union for such activities
as setting up accounts in favor of international bodies charged with postwar reconstruction as well as "the super-national policing body charged
with the duty of preserving the peace." 2 6 He declared that the Union
could become "the pivot of the future economic government of the
world" 7-an international version of Keynes' domestic "separate autonomies" and a considerably augmented descendant of his 1919 "economic Council of Europe." Keynes characterized the "surrender of sovereignty" inherent in his proposed Currency Union as "financial disarmaHe viewed the international restraint on sovereignty entailed
ment."'
by his proposal as one of its key attractions: it was an "advantage,

MAIN OBJECTS OF THE PLAN], reprinted in XXV COLLECTED WRITINGS, supra

note

92, at 399, 404.
220. See, e.g., HARROD, supra note 202, at 525-526; see also THE MAIN OBJECTS
OF THE PLAN, supra note 219, at 404.
221.
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE BRrISH PROJECT FOR A CLEARING UNION (C.U.) AND THE AMERICAN PROJECT FOR A
STABILISATION FUND (S.F.) (1943), reprinted in XXV COLLECTED WRITNGS, supra

note 92, at 215, 225.
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. See id. at 220.
225. See id. at 225.
226. CLEARING UNION, supra note 204, at 168, 189-90.
227. Id. at 189.
228. CURRENCY UNION, supra note 205, at 42, 57.
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rather than a disadvantage, of the scheme that it invites the member
states and groups to abandon that license to promote indiscipline, disorder and bad-neighborliness which, to the general disadvantage, they have
been free to exercise hitherto."
Finally, we may associate these tendencies in Keynes' formulations
with his more speculative vision of a systematic overhaul of the relationship between national groups, political borders, and economic integration.
One view of the post-war world which I find sympathetic... is that we
should encourage small political and cultural units, combined into larger,
and more or less closely knit, economic units. It would be a fine thing to
have thirty or forty capital cities in Europe, each the centre of a selfgoverning country entirely free from national minorities (who would be

dealt with by migrations if necessary) and the seat of a government and a

parliament and a cultural and university centre, each with their own pride
and glory and their own characteristics and excellent gifts. But it would
be ruinous to have thirty or forty entirely independent economic and
currency units. Therefore, I would encourage customs unions and customs
preferences covering groups of political and geographical units, and also
currency unions, railway unions and the like.
Thus it would be preferable, if it were possible, that the members [of the
International Currency Union] should, in some cases at least, be groups of
countries rather than separate units?'
This rather astonishing passage merits close reading-for it represents
a drastic shift in Keynes' reflections on the relationship between nationalism and internationalism, in which he gives international authority a
central, creative role and reinterprets nationalism as cultural difference.
Heightening his Thirties' acknowledgment of the irreconcilability of
nationalist differences, he now envisions their permanence. This radical
accentuation of his recognition of nationalism entails an extreme solution
to the conflict between "national temperaments": the creation of a system of homogeneous states, with minorities "dealt with by migrations if
necessary."' With this proposal, Keynes departed even further than he

229.

Id. at 57-58.

230. Id. at 55 [emphasis added]. Keynes added that the economic federations he
envisioned in the last quoted sentence were not indispensable; the Union could be
organized along "nationalistic or economic federationist lines" and his proposal could
be adjusted "either to older or newer notions." Id. at 56-57.
231. Id.
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did in the Thirties from his 1919 assimilationist dismissal of the
problem of national minorities in places like Upper Silesia.
Keynes also envisioned disciplining nationalism by reinterpreting it as
limited to cultural difference, or at least as potentially so limited.
Authority transcending states or nations would implement, or at least enforce, this discipline. The creation of the new "small units" 32 where
homogeneous cultures could flourish, "free from national minorities",
would presumably require massive international involvement, rather than
mere encouragement. His simultaneous advocacy of unprecedented regional and international authority over economic matters would signify a
great attenuation of state sovereignty, as well as serve to further restrain
nationalism within its cultural limits.
In this strand of Keynes' writing, his discipline of reconstruction becomes comprehensive and truly international. He sought to empower
international authority to engage in far-reaching experimentation with
nationalist and economic forces, while pressing states into the service of
internationalism. In this conception, nationalism is viewed as a cultural
force, permanent and exclusivist, yet amenable to international discipline.
International authority would determine political, or, rather, political/cultural frontiers, bypassing deference to either "natural" economic
regions (as in the Economic Consequences) 3 or the frontiers of nationalist legitimacy (as in National Self-Sufficiency). 34 Economic forces
would be disciplined through their unification into regional federations,
integrated into an international economic order.
Ultimate experimental authority thus moves from the level of the state
or nation to that of the international, while nationalism is firmly incorporated into the political order through comprehensive political reconstruction. Indeed, this passage from Keynes' Forties' writings represents
a close approximation to the "paradox" he denigrated in the Versailles
settlement: a paradoxical. juxtaposition of a very strong version of nationalism with dramatically augmented international authority. The point
of lingering over this passage is not an inquiry into what Keynes "really
thought" but into the permutations which his discipline of reconstruction
was capable of undergoing. This Forties variant of Keynes' views of the
relationship between politics and economics, public and private, reason
and emotion, international and national, embodies the most dramatic

232.
233.
234.

Id.
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES, supra note 9.
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departure from the views of the 1919 author of the Economic Consequences.
V. POLICY PROPOSALS AND MODERNIST FAITH
...

the futility of basing ethnic nationality on the race of peoples,

which continually disappears and forms itself anew like the sparkling of
glass in a kaleidoscope ....
Baron Alphonse de Heyking, La Conception de I'Etat et l'idie de la
cohesion ethnique (1927)
I think that what Keynes had in mind is an aspect of ... his kaleidic
account of the economic process of history. By the kaleidic theory I mean
the view that the expectations, which together with the drive of needs or
ambitions make up the 'springs of action', are at all times so
insubstantially founded... that they can undergo complete transformation
in an hour or even a moment, as the patterns in the kaleidoscope dissolve
at a touch.2
G.L.S. Shackle, Keynesian Kaleidics (1974)
The foregoing presentation of Keynes' theories suggests several
general conclusions and poses a puzzling dilemma. First, we have seen
how Keynes constructed his discipline of economic reconstruction
through assigning nationalism a series of roles: the excluded
irrational, 7 the enlisted experimentalp and the disciplined
cultural. 9 Secondly, the distinctiveness of Keynes' conception of economics forces a rethinking of conventional distinctions between economic, political, and cultural analysis and policyZ' Thirdly, the basic schema of Keynes' analysis, the "harnessing" of "uncontrollable psychology"
and "animal spirits," participates in general cultural fears and fantasies
of the interwar period. Fourthly, these conclusions suggest that one of
the major alternatives structuring public debate in the interwar period,
and in our own, has a curiously indeterminate structure. To be a sophis-

235. BARON ALPHONSE DE HEYKING, LA CONCEPTION DE L'ETAT E L'IDEE DE LA
COHESION ETHNIQUE, LE POINT DE VUE DU DROIT PUBLIC Er DES GENS 19 (1927).
236.
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ticated disciplinarian of reconstruction is to grapple with a set of elements whose place in one's framework can shift dramatically, perhaps
with changing circumstances, perhaps with changing allegiances. To advocate an "economic" (or a "political") approach signifies less a determinate position than a particular point of departure from which such
"supplemental" considerations as nationalism (or economics) will be
accommodated in a series of often surprisingly shifting ways. The general cultural anxieties and hopes underlying the structure of this rhetoric
seem more decisive than the particular elements with which they are
associated.
The issue left unexamined is that of the source of confidence in the
efficacy of this schema. Given the turbulent cultural basis they thought
underlay the crises they analyzed, why did modernist policymakers like
Keynes believe in the efficacy of their prescriptions? Why should an advanced form of sophisticated reason be viewed as capable of accurately
diagnosing and disciplining unruly psychological forces whose very
description seems to render them impervious to such discipline? In this
concluding section, I suggest that this confidence is not the product of
technocratic rationality but a faith, a modernist faith, closely associated
with the fears and fantasies it is meant to assuage.
The interwar international lawyers who defended and implemented the
Versailles system for dealing with nationalism faced similar difficulties.24' They saw the relationship between the turbulent nation and the
new international authorities as a novel "alliance"24": between advanced
internationalist "experimentation" and nationalist "primitivism," 43 between complex international institutional and doctrinal innovation and
the "essence" 2" of national groups. In other words, they believed in
what Keynes pejoratively called the "paradox" of the Versailles settlement, a version of which he put forward in the Forties. Defense of the
various Versailles techniques for dealing with nationalism depended on
this modernist faith in a paradoxical alliance between the pacific potential of nationalist aspiration and the benevolent rationality of international authority. It entailed rejection of the notion that nationalism was
irremediably violent and transnational or that international authority was
purely a mask for power politics.

241.
242.
243.
244.
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Let me quickly summarize some of the predictive arguments one
could have made in 1919 about the three main techniques for dealing
with nationalism in the Versailles system, viz., the creation of national
states in central Europe, the imposition of Minority Protection Treaties,
and the design of "experimental" international regimes for the Saar,
Danzig, and Upper Silesia. One 6ould have argued either that the construction of the new national states would provide final satisfaction of
nationalist claims, or that it would intensify those desires and lead to
wars between those states. One could have argued either that the establishment of minority protection within those new states would facilitate
the minority groups' cultural flourishing while ensuring their political
loyalty, or that it would create hotbeds of particularistic resentment and
irredentist agitation. One could have argued either that the creation of
international regimes for certain regions would result in thriving
multicultural societies appreciative of international benevolence, or that it
would provide convenient symbolic targets for nationalist propaganda
pointing at the diabolical forces under the international mask.
At a minimum, the belief in the first side of each of these alternatives required the notion that a "good" form of international policy
could find the right set of techniques that could bring out, or be allied
with, the "good" side of nationalism in each particular situation. Yet,
even this view would require suspending one's knowledge of the mercurial, "kaleidoscopic" quality of nationalism. Moreover, it would require
ignoring the effect of an international presence on nationalist passion,
effects that Hitler manipulated in the plebiscite campaign in the internationalized territory of the Saar-and that nationalists in the 1990's have
also found useful.
In view of the potential instability Keynes attributed to the economy,
one would expect to find analogous leaps of faith in both the
disciplinability of economic forces and the wisdom of policy authority
(even if, as befitting a modernist priest, Keynes often expressed an ironic attitude towards his own faith). On the first issue, as one commentator argues, the "key propensities of a laissez-faire economy like the
'inducement to invest' and the 'propensity to hoard' which are presented
as inherently unruly have to be made sufficiently tractable to be acted
upon by the policymaker."2' Keynes' technique to accomplish this aim
in the General Theory is to treat "expectations as given, or unchanging
in the relevant unit of time."'2 This technique separated Keynes the
245.
246.,
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policy proposer from Keynes the social theorist in at least two ways
reminiscent of policy proposers concerned with nationalism: first, it
abstracted from his assertion of the ever-present potential instability in
investment psychology and, secondly, it abstracted "from any effect of
'
policy on the psychology of society."247
Keynes himself gave an example of the latter problem in relation to
monetary policy. One consequence of the economy's psychological dynamics is a limitation on the efficacy of government manipulation of the
interest rate. First, the rate of interest cannot be pushed lower than a
certain minimum level, below which liquidity preference will preclude
lending. Secondly, lenders will not have faith in the durability of a rate
of interest which, in Keynes' words, they view as "experimental"; 2
lowering interest rates in this way may have the opposite effect than
intended, namely, an increase in liquidity preference. "Experimental"
policy could thus fail to achieve the desired "harnessing" of business
psychology precisely due to its "experimental" character.
Yet, as one commentator points out, this effect on business psychology could also result from Keynes' preferred method of economic stimulus, government spending on public works. If such spending
strikes the business community as unsound, the state of confidence goes
down, and liquidity preference goes up. It will then require an increasing
quantity of money pumped into the economy to prevent the rate of interest from rising, which increases lack of confidence, liquidity preference,
and so on. This brings us back to the ultimate independent variable: the
'state of the news.'249
Keynes would thus have proven too much: his introduction of psychological uncertainty into the economy would have taken us from a
self-adjusting economy all the way to an economy incapable of adjustment. We would then have to agree with G.L.S. Shackle, the archetypal
Keynesian "fundamentalist": "Keynes' book achieves its triumph by
pointing out that the problems it is concerned with are essentially beyond solution."" 0 We would, however, thereby be either ignoring
Keynes' repeated advocacy precisely of economic "experimentation" or
convicting him of simple inconsistency.

247.
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I argue, instead, that, like other modernist policy proposers, Keynes
manifested a paradoxical faith in an alliance between policy "experimentation" and the "uncontrollable and disobedient psychology of the business world" '-Keynes' version of the very kind of "paradox" he decried in the Versailles system. Indeed, writing about H.G. Wels's
Clissold, Keynes seemed to envision how surplus business energies, so
dangerous when they took the deviant form of speculation and panics,
could be "harnessed" for deep social transformation.
The creative intellect of mankind is to be found not in [the Labour
Movement] but amongst the scientists and the great modem business
men .... We must recruit our revolutionaries, therefore, from the Right,
not from the Left .... Clissold's direction is to the Left-far, far to the

, Left; but he seeks to summon from the Right the creative force and the
constructive will to carry him there. He describes himself as temperamentally and fundamentally a liberal. But political liberalism must die 'to be

born again with firmer features and a clearer will',m
Keynes partially agreed with Clissold-he viewed certain kinds of business energy, the "spontaneous optimism" of "animal spirits," as a modem "primitive" force which can be "harnessed" for constructive social
transformations.
Like the interwar lawyers concerned with nationalism, Keynes also
felt that such forces could be greatly destructive.' As I noted above,
the potentially destructive aspects of social energy feared by Keynes
find their nearly identical equivalents in interwar reflections on nationalism. Nonetheless, like Clissold and his legal counterparts, Keynes spoke
of the need to recognize the value of "spontaneous, volcanic and even
wicked impulses," while simultaneously affirming "the order and pattern
of life amongst communities.""U4 This paradoxical double aspiration
represents a generalization of his specific faith in an alliance between
unruly investment psychology and economic policy, between "the spontaneous optimism" of "animal spirits"' and an "extension of the traditional functions of government."' 6 It also evokes the writings of an
interwar legal theorist who spoke in homologous fashion of the need for
law to "model itself on the real movement of nationalities, on the pathos
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of an elemental force that arises in the history of peoples," 7 while
urging that this "creative, emotional passionate movement," this "tumultuous flood of history, ' ' S "discipline itself in adapting to the conception of law from which it derives its legitimate title."' ' 9
The second element of modernist faith was belief in the wisdom,
however "experimental," of the new policy authority-whether situated
on the state or international levels-and its capacity to interpret and
"canalize" unstable nationalist or economic forces. This assumption can
be challenged in a variety of ways. A relatively generous form of this
criticism would be to view the experimental policymaker as a tool in
the hands of cynical manipulators. Thus, Keynes thought that Wilson
had allowed his idealistic vision to be transformed into rhetorical cover
for British and French political maneuvers at the Paris Peace Conference. ° Keynes' friend, Duncan Grant, argued that Keynes should see
his own wartime service in the British Treasury as providing Cambridge
brains and legitimacy for crass ends: Grant wrote to Keynes that he was
"a genie taken out of Kings... by savages to serve them faithfully for
their savage ends, and then-back you go into the bottle."26 ' A less
generous view would be to view the policy recommendations as themselves embodying an arrogant will to power by the cultural sophisticate.
One commentator has argued that "Bloomsbury fuelled Keynes' fantasies
of elitist discretion imbued with pure motives . . . and encouraged his
26
attempts to convert such fantasies into a real world expression.""
Sometimes these two criticisms-the will to power of the policy
authority itself and its manipulation by nefarious forces-are combined.
An extravagant version of this kind of criticism can be found in the
1919 attack by the Italian poet and war hero Gabriele D'Annunzio on
the Paris Peace Conference in general and on Woodrow Wilson and his
"Fourteen Points" in particular:.
All the rebels of all the races will be gathered under our sign ...
[Tihe new crusade of all poor and free men against the usurping nations,
the accumulators of all wealth, against the races of prey and against the
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caste of usurers who yesterday exploited war in order to exploit peace
today, the new crusade will reestablish that true justice that has been

crucified by an icy maniac with fourteen dull points and with a hammer
borrowed from the German Chancellor.

Combining rhetoric of left and right, D'Annunzio thus saw Wilson as a
mad power seeker in his own right and as a tool in the hands of both
the "usurping nations" and an international cabal of "usurers."
D'Annunzio sought to establish an "anti-League of Nations"'' composed of "the rebels of all races" to oppose this kind of policy experimentation. D'Annunzio's speeches of this period are classics of the
genre because they prefigure a wide variety of subsequent critiques of
international experimentation-from Thirties' fascists to Sixties' Third
Worldists.2
Yet, one need not be an adherent of any specific ideology to question
the identification of the "best and brightest" policymakers with benevolent reason. As I have suggested, a key characteristic of the modernist
position is its seemingly obsessive fear of the border-defying aspect of
nationalist and business energy. The need to bind such energy, to "discipline" or "harness" it may indeed be reasonable in some circumstances, yet it may express an irrational fear of misunderstood forces in others. Moreover, this obsessive fear tends to be associated with a range of
political and social prejudices, in our time as well as in the interwar
period.
The fear that the Versailles recognition of self-determination would
lead to destabilization by transnational nationalist forces affected the
design of the policies for dealing with nationalist aspirations. A common
criticism of the interwar minority protection system, for example, was
that it reinforced trans-border links between members of ethnic groups
either with states in which their ethnic group formed the majority' or
with minority communities of their kin in other countries. The deMIcHAEL A. LEDEEN, THE FIRsT DucE: D'ANNUNZIo AT FIuME 120 (1977).
264. Id. at 177.
265. Id. at vii-x, 120, 200-203.
266. The minority protection system was designed to prevent giving such "kinstates" any role in defending their "co-nationals" in other countries. See Report of the
Committee Instituted by the Council Resolution of March 7, 1929 in LEAGuE OF NATIONS, SpEc. Supp. 73, at 42, 63 (1929).
267. The Polish leader Paderewski tried to argue against the minority protection
system by evoking the fear of the transnational power of the Jews. Memorandum of
M. Paderewski (June 15, 1919) in MNUTES OF THE COMMrTEE ON NEW STATES
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fenders of the system tried to show that the system was designed in
such a way to restrain potentially uncontrollable trans-border forces.'61
Keynes, as we have seen, feared the destabilizing effects of the transnational mobility of speculative capital for a good part of his career. In
the Forties, some of the troubling aspects of this fear came out in his
statements that countries could no longer tolerate the flight of funds for
a variety of reasons, including the "anticipation of the owner turning
refugee. '2 " In the Thirties, as I have noted, Keynes had even participated in the unsavory political rhetoric of the time with his denunciations of the "decadent international but individualistic capitalism in the
hands of which we found ourselves after the war."
There are many ways in which one can argue that these fears can
often be misplaced, even without the odious politics with which they are
sometimes associated. I would like to mention two of these ways because they seem particularly characteristic of our own time and show
the potentially positive links between transnational economic and nationalist forces. Rather than exclusively portending uncontrollable violence,
transnational ethnic connections often form the basis for productive economic links between various parts of the world. An American journalist
has recently set out to show how ethnic diasporas, or "global tribes,"
have served throughout history as crucial agents of international economic development."' In the past, these "tribes" were indispensable for
forging trade links; today, they often remain on the cutting edge of
trade and technological innovation. Thus, the emphasis on reinforcing
policy structures to control nationalist longings and capital flight may
often be misplaced; for it is often ethnic loyalties which assure that
capital movements are responsible and rational. Fidelity to the productive economy may be secured precisely through the combination of the
two transnational forces of economic desire and ethnic solidarity.
Alternatively, transnational capital mobility may produce the conditions for the reinforcement of local community solidarity. Saskia Sassen
has shown how the development of a hyper-mobile financial industry,
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made possible by seemingly dematerialized cyber-space, has led to increasing concentration of business in certain cities. "Paradoxically,"
Sassen concludes, "in particular instances, the local and the global will
be partners, co-conspirators, indispensable allies."' This "paradox" is
the post-modem converse of the modernist faith which I have been
describing. An emphasis on international policy to regulate potentially
destabilizing transnational energies may thus often be misplaced: for
Sassen describes the possibility that the unleashed international energy of
technological and economic innovation may bring renewed legitimacy
and scope for local policy regulation. In Sassen's vision, we would
reverse the more familiar associations with the local and the international: Sassen identifies avant-garde policy with local community solidarity,
and unleashed energy with international business. Sassen's post-modem
faith would believe in the possibility of a "paradoxical alliance" of this
new configuration.
Thus, there are good reasons for thinking that modernist fears, fantasies, and faith are part of a rhetoric, rather than a logic-a rhetoric
whose descriptive accuracy may be only fortuitous in relation to particular historical situations. This flexible rhetoric, composed of all of its
alternative versions, is a structure of images whose hold on elite discourse has lasted at least a century. It is a rhetoric of unleashed energy
flows and the "experimentalist" rationality that seeks to discipline them,
a rhetoric with deep cultural connotations, rather than an inexorable
logic of modem society. Sometimes the metaphor of energy, with its
promises and dangers, is projected on underlying social forces, sometimes on the sophisticated policy makers. Sometimes the metaphor of
productive rationality is projected on the policy makers, sometimes on
the underlying social forces. Sometimes danger is said to come from the
excessive unleashing of energy, by transnational speculation or transfrontier nationalism, and sometimes from the magnification of avantgarde policy authority into a sadistic super-ego.
If we cannot give up this rhetoric, if its hold on us is too tenacious,
we can at least become aware of its indeterminacy and manipulability,
as well as of the cultural and historical connotations with which it has
become associated. We can expose its deeply gendered and ethnically
inflected imagery. We can become aware of the extent to which some
of the more determined efforts to move outside this rhetoric often replicate some of its basic assumptions. We may claim no longer to believe
fully in the modernist paradox, that of "an existence oriented solely
271.
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toward Boulevard Bonne Nouvelle, in rooms by Le Corbusier and
Oud" 272-to
quote one of Keynes' culture-critic contemporaries. Yet,
our own fears, fantasies, and faith continue to emerge out of the kinds
of crisis moments that have served as the recurrent point of departure of
much of twentieth century culture:
With the [First] World War a process began to become apparent which
has not halted since then ...For never has experience been contradicted
more thoroughly than strategic experience by tactical warfare, economic
experience by inflation, bodily experience by mechanical warfare, moral
experience by those in power. A generation ... now stood under the
open sky in a countryside in which nothing remained unchanged but the
clouds, and beneath those clouds, in a field force of destructive torrents
and explosions, was the tiny, fragile human body. 3
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